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Subj: MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP LEJEUNE, ANTITERRORISM/FORCE
PROTECTION (AT/FP) PLAN

Ref: (a) DoDD 2000.12
(b) DoD Instruction 2000.16
(c) DoD 0-2000.12-H
(d) DoDD 5200.8R
(e) SECNAVINST 5520.3b
(f) MCO 3302.1C
(g) Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-34, "Antiterrorism/Force
Protection Installation Planning Template," 2 Apr 98
(h) USMC/NCIS MOU, 26 Feb 97
(i) BO P3440.6C
(j) BO 5500.3A
(k) MCO 5500.6F

[Note: HAZMAT emergencies are addressed in BO 11320.1J.
Standard Operational Procedures (SOP's) for the Base Operations
Center (BOC) are addressed in BO P3000.10. General physical
security requirements are addressed in OPNAVINST 5530.14B.]

Encl: (1) Locator Sheet

1. Purpose. To establish policy, responsibilities, procedures
and standards for Marine Corps Base (MCB), Camp Lejeune, and
tenant activities in Antiterrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP)
requirements.

2. Background. This Manual consolidates all information
concerning installation AT/FP plans.

3. Information. Per reference (f), this Plan is implemented
utilizing the guidelines of reference (g) and is applicable to

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all units/agencies assigned to and stationed aboard MCB, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

4. Action. Commanders, subordinate commanders, and assistant chiefs of staff will be prepared to support the requirements of this Plan.

5. Reserve Applicability. This Manual is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

6. Concurrence. This Manual has been coordinated with and concurred in by the Commanding Generals, II Marine Expeditionary Force; 2d Marine Division; 2d FSSG, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic; 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Cherry Point, and the Commanding Officers, Marine Corps Air Station, New River, Naval Hospital, and Naval Dental Clinic.


A. J. KARLE JR.
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: A plus AC/S, ISS (3)
PMO (2)

BO P3302.1
28 SEP 2000

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN (AT/FP PLAN)

LOCATOR SHEET

Subj: ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) PLAN

Location: _____
(Indicate location(s) of copy(ies) of this Manual.)

ENCLOSURE (1)

ANTITERRORISM-FORCE PROTECTION PLAN (AT/FP PLAN)

RECORD OF CHANGES

Log completed change action as indicated.

Change Number	Date of Change	Date Entered	Signature of Person Incorporating Change

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN (AT/FP)

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ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN (AT/FP)

CHAPTER 1

SITUATION

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ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN (AT/FP)

CHAPTER 1

SITUATION

1000. SITUATION

1001. GENERAL. Per reference (f), this Plan is implemented utilizing the guidelines of reference (g) and is applicable to all units/agencies assigned to and stationed aboard Marine Corps Base (MCB), Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. AT/FP-related conditions may develop which threaten the safety of personnel and mission-essential property/resources aboard the Base requiring the Commanding General to direct the implementation of security measures and operations to augment those normally conducted by the Military Police (MP). This Plan focuses on the implementation of AT/FP protective measures aimed at reducing the vulnerability of this installation to a terrorist or other criminal attack, and addresses specific actions to be taken in the event a successful attack should occur. AT/FP training, intelligence dissemination, operational security (OPSEC), physical security, and personal security/awareness training are all key ingredients to the success of this Plan.

1. The Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has primary responsibility for terrorist incidents in the United States. The right to determine jurisdiction rests with the DOJ.
2. The authority to implement this Plan rests with the Commanding General (CG), MCB, Camp Lejeune (CamLej) or designated representative.
3. Upon implementation of this Plan, the Chief of Staff (C/S) or designated representative assumes command of all forces committed to this Plan and becomes the Commander, Crisis Management Team (CCMT). The Base Operations Center (BOC) is activated.

1002. ENEMY FORCES

1. A threat assessment (Intel/Criminal) is conducted annually by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and may be accessed by contacting the NCIS. The threat assessment, the

criticality assessment and the vulnerability assessment are the three linked assessments, which together form the risk assessment of this Plan. The results of this process may be viewed in the completed Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA) Decision Matrix. See Appendix A.

2. The opposing forces may include, but are not limited to:

a. Terrorist organizations whose operational traditions may be national (to include domestic organizations), transnational, or international. These groups may be either non-state supported, state supported, or state directed. Such organizations can be expected to operate in a determined fashion to achieve their political goals and are prepared to kill innocent bystanders in the process.

b. Subversive, radical and other dissident groups or elements that may commit unlawful acts with a primary goal of disrupting Base activities.

c. A mentally disturbed individual.

d. One or more common criminals forced to take hostages to effect their escape. Criminals may change (or appear to change) their objectives and become "politically motivated" when it suits their illicit ends.

3. Opposing forces may be considered armed and dangerous.

4. Opposing forces actions and reactions may be difficult to predict.

1003. FRIENDLY FORCES

1. All personnel and materiel resources stationed at the Base are available to support this Plan based upon the assumption that the II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) and major subordinate commands are in a non-deployed status at the time of the activation. (In a deployment situation, students from the School of Infantry's (SOI) Marine Combat Training (MCT), the Marine Corps Engineer School (MCES), and the Marine Corps Combat Service Support School (MCCSSS), along with other available commands, will be utilized.)

1004. MILITARY FORCES

1. Commanding General, II MEF, provides resources as required, dependent upon availability.
2. Commanding General, 2d Marine Division (2d MARDIV), is to be prepared to chop resources Tactical Control (TACON) as required, dependent upon availability.
3. Commanding General, 2d Force Service Support Group (2d FSSG), provides resources as required, dependent upon availability.
4. Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (2d MAW), Cherry Point, conducts air operations in support of the CCMT and provides reconnaissance.
5. Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital (NavHosp), Camp Lejeune, executes medical operations as required.
6. U.S. Coast Guard contributes to the MCB, Camp Lejeune AT/FP effort through the protection of life and property under maritime conditions.

1005. CIVILIAN FORCES

1. Federal, state, county and local law enforcement agencies may become involved in AT/FP incidents/operations in mutual aid situations, adjacent to or on the Base. Per references (e) and (h), NCIS has exclusive responsibility on criminal and security investigative or counter-intelligence matters with federal law enforcement agencies. NCIS is the primary agency for liaison with state, local, and foreign law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, including those of military departments. Agencies could include a combination of any of the below listed agencies:

- a. NCIS, Camp Lejeune Field Office, MCB, Camp Lejeune, NC.
- b. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice, Wilmington, NC. (FBI Special Agent is located at the NCIS Camp Lejeune Field Office.)
- c. U.S. Secret Service, Wilmington, NC.

- d. U.S. Marshal's Service, NC Eastern District, DOJ, Raleigh, NC.
- e. U.S. Coast Guard, Camp Lejeune, NC.
- f. NC State Highway Patrol, Onslow County Area, Jacksonville, NC.
- g. NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), Jacksonville, NC.
- h. Onslow County Sheriff's Department (OCSD), Jacksonville, NC.
- i. Jacksonville Police Department (JPD), Jacksonville, NC.
- j. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IV, Atlanta, GA.
- k. NC Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management, Raleigh, NC.
- l. Onslow County Office of Emergency Services, Jacksonville, NC.

[Note: Per reference (h), the Provost Marshal's Office (PMO), MCB, Camp Lejeune, has a responsibility to establish liaison with state, county and local law enforcement agencies.]

2. Dependent upon assumption of jurisdiction, NCIS is prepared to provide trained negotiators, offensive listening devices, intelligence and investigative support. Support teams will generally be organized in the following manner: Hostage Negotiation Team and Intelligence Team. The Hostage Negotiation Team is responsible for establishing communication with barricaded suspects, hostage takers, suicidal individuals, and in other crisis-related situations. A negotiator's primary objective is to prevent loss of life or the further loss of life; this objective is accomplished through open discussions and communication. The Intelligence Team is responsible for gathering information pertinent to crisis negotiation incidents, threats against persons or locations, and any other incident that may arise. During crisis negotiations, this team identifies the suspects and conducts interviews to assist in determining the state of mind of the individual involved. The

Negotiation and Intelligence Team works closely to resolve crisis situations. In non-crisis situations, the Intelligence Team conducts threat assessments for high-risk individuals (SECNAV, CINC's, etc.) and installations.

1006. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. The following organizations may be activated during the period this Plan is in effect:

1. Crisis Management Team (CMT). The primary responsibilities of the CMT are: (1) management of Base resources in support of the Threat Management Force (TMF); and (2) formulation of recommendations for actions by the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, and the CMT Commander. The CMT consists of a nucleus, which can be augmented at the discretion of the CMT Commander. On declaration of an AT/FP emergency, its members (or designated representatives) will be activated and report to the Base Operations Center (BOC) located in Building 1. Staff (AC/S) departments will be prepared to provide continuous support (24/7) to the BOC as required. The CMT is comprised of the following:

- a. C/S, MCB, Camp Lejeune (or designated representative), CMT Commander.
- b. DAC/S, Installation Security and Safety (ISS)
- c. AC/S, Training, Education and Operations (TE&O), Assistant CMT Commander.
- d. II MEF Liaison.
- e. Area Commanders, as directed.
- f. NCIS/FBI Liaison.
- g. Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).
- h. AC/S, Management Support Department (MSD).
- i. AC/S, Logistics (Log).
- j. AC/S, Facilities (Fac).
- k. Dir, Consolidated Public Affairs Office (CPAO).

1. CO, NavHosp, Camp Lejeune.

m. AC/S, Manpower (Manp).

n. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) representative, as directed.

2. Threat Management Force (TMF). The TMF is task organized, under the direction of the TMF Commander, the AC/S, ISS (or designated representative), to respond to circumstances and activities affecting the AT/FP posture aboard Base, including those that may require special responses and tactics. The TMF comprises all elements within the immediate area of a prospective active terrorist or force protection emergency. Units, forces and assets available to the TMF, which may form its component parts, are:

a. On-Scene Command Post

(1) On-Scene Commander, Provost Marshal's Office (PMO).

(2) Area Commander representative, as required.

(3) Recorder (PMO).

(4) Patrol representative (PMO).

(5) Special Reaction Team (SRT) representative (PMO).

(6) CID/Military Police Investigator (MPI) representative (PMO).

(7) NCIS representative.

(8) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) representative, as required.

(9) Fire Protection Division representative, as required.

(10) NavHosp, Camp Lejeune representative (Mass Casualty), as required.

(11) Liaison Officer, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), New River, as required.

(12) Clerks (PMO)

(13) Radio Operators (PMO)

(14) CPAO, as required 3. Special Reaction Team. The SRT is comprised of specially trained and equipped MP personnel of PMO. They are capable of immediate deployment to incidents involving a sniper, barricaded criminal(s), terrorist(s), or hostage taker(s).

a. Additional SRT capabilities are: dynamic entry, specialized weapons use, surveillance, reconnaissance, sniper teams, and VIP security.

4. On-Site Security Elements

a. Purpose. The security force function is designed to detect, deter, and defeat terrorism as well as prevent and deter theft and other losses caused by such things as fire, accident, sabotage, and espionage. On-site security elements will be integrated into the overall TMF operation.

b. Responsibility. The AC/S, ISS is responsible for overall safety and security of the Base. The Provost Marshal is the designated representative tasked with the protection of life, property, and the rights of individuals, while enforcing all pertinent rules, regulations, and statutes.

c. Background. MCB, Camp Lejeune is under exclusive federal jurisdiction; and federal laws apply. Under the Assimilated Crimes Act, military and civilian suspects can be charged with violations of state criminal statutes if a federal law does not apply.

d. Application. PMO is the first line of defense against hostile acts against the installation. In situations where PMO is unable to provide first response or on-site security, the responsibility falls to the respective Area Commanders.

(1) Area Commanders have overall responsibility for their areas. The Area Guard Force (AGF) serves as the Commander's on-site security element. In the event of a criminal or critical incident, the AGF may be called upon to provide the initial response and assess the situation. The AGF will then immediately notify the Consolidated Dispatch Center at 911 or 451-3004/5.

(2) Upon notification, the ISS representative will immediately assume investigative/jurisdictional responsibility for the incident and coordinate a response with the Area Commander(s). As applicable, Area Commanders will provide AGF augmentation at the scene as an auxiliary to PMO. Generally, the MP will replace other security elements performing "inner perimeter" security functions. AGF personnel will augment MP personnel in the performance of "outer perimeter" and other security functions, as required.

(3) The On-scene Commander (normally the MP Watch Commander) is in charge of all responding security forces until relieved by the Provost Marshal or AC/S, ISS. Upon assessing the circumstances, PMO's initial first responders will immediately give a situation report to the AC/S, ISS or the immediate On-scene Commander.

(4) PMO will notify the Base Command Duty Officer and the CPAO as soon as possible.

(5) All AT/FP training and reaction drills for the AGF will be at the direction of AC/S, ISS, in coordination with the AC/S, TE&O).

(6) Use of force will be in accordance with reference (k) and page 3-27 of this Manual.

5. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team. Under conditions of a threatened (or actual) explosive attack, an EOD Team will be activated and assigned OPCON to the TME Commander.

6. Area Guard Force (AGF). The AGF is a 35-man, platoon-sized element (or appropriately sized force) provided by the local Area Commander; as applicable, the AGF will assist the MP in isolating the target area.

7. Supplemental Reaction Force (SRF)

a. The SRF is a battalion-sized force, normally provided by the 2d MARDIV, commanded by the organic battalion staff TACCON to the CMT Commander. (The SRF will be augmented with three armed security boats from Small Craft Company, if deemed necessary.) Under AT/FP conditions, the SRF's mission is to augment the Base security effort. If the 2d MARDIV is deployed, a suitable alternate battalion-sized element will be selected to assume this mission (i.e., students from SOI, MCES, MCCSSS).

[Note: All SRF personnel will be equipped with normal combat weapons and equipment and MOPP-4 capable, as well as riot control gear.]

b. SRF personnel should be trained and equipped to perform tasks including, but not limited to, guarding fixed sites, patrolling, running checkpoints or supporting a response to chemical/biological incidents.

1007. ASSUMPTIONS

1. Camp Lejeune may become a potential target for terrorism, criminal activity, civil disturbances, and other force protection-related activities.
2. If II MEF is deployed at the time of the precipitating event, the CCMT will allocate forces from available non-deployed units.
3. The Base's security forces are inadequate to prevent a determined terrorist force from breaching perimeter security.
4. Any terrorist attack will affect both military and civilian activities. Mutual assistance between military and civilian law enforcement and emergency management agencies is necessary and will be available.
5. Internal AT/FP action will be necessary during the period before the FBI assumes primary jurisdiction. If the FBI declines jurisdiction, resolution of the terrorist incident will fall to Base AT/FP assets.
6. Subject to approval by the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, and concurrence by the CG, II MEF, all units in receipt of this Plan will support Base AT/FP operations within their capability and consistent with the requirements of their primary operational mission.

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN (AT/FP)

CHAPTER 2

MISSION

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ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN (AT/FP)

CHAPTER 2

MISSION

2000. MISSION. On order, MCB, Camp Lejeune, conducts AT/FP operations (crisis-management) to safeguard personnel and mission-essential property and resources against terrorists or other criminal threats and conducts consequence-management operations in the event a successful attack should occur. To accomplish this mission, the Base will meet the following four objectives:

1. Deter Terrorist Incidents. Initiate action to dissuade terrorists from targeting or attacking installation assets by implementing the appropriate THREATCON measures as prescribed in this Plan. (See Appendix B.)
2. Employ Countermeasures. Employ the appropriate mix of AT/FP countermeasures to prevent terrorists from attacking.
3. Mitigate the Effects of a Terrorist Incident. Employ a full range of active and passive measures to lessen the impact of terrorist events directed against the installation.
4. Recover from a Terrorist Incident. In the event of a successful attack against the installation, MCB, Camp Lejeune, will implement appropriate consequence-management plans and operational measures to recover from the effects of the incident. Terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) represents a central and potentially overwhelming task for the installation. WMD considerations are therefore to be included in first responder-related training, exercise scenario development, medical reaction planning, and the Base-wide division of responsibility in a prospective AT/FP emergency.

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN (AT/FP)

CHAPTER 3

EXECUTION

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ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN (AT/FP)

CHAPTER 3

EXECUTION

3000. EXECUTION

3001. COMMANDER'S INTENT. The installation commander's intent is to ensure a safe environment for all service members, civilians, and their families who work, live, or play aboard MCB, Camp Lejeune. Protecting personnel is always the first priority. Protecting critical, mission-essential facilities is the second priority. High-density, populated areas (such as Base housing, dependents schools, barracks buildings, day-care centers, Commissary, Exchange, Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) facilities, headquarters buildings, and the Naval Hospital) represent relatively soft, therefore potential targets for terrorist activity. Such areas will receive our highest level of attention during periods of heightened alert. Additionally, during the conduct of AT/FP operations, MCB, Camp Lejeune, must remain capable of supporting the training and deployment of II MEF and conducting reconstitution of forces as necessary.

3002. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. The response to terrorist actions will involve activation of the Crisis Management Team and Threat Management Force in varying degrees. MCB, Camp Lejeune, does not have sufficient organic assets to safeguard the entire Base from a terrorist-related incident. Accomplishing our AT/FP mission will be largely dependent on the extent to which Area Commanders develop alert, readiness, and recall procedures based on the guidelines of this Plan and provide for the internal security/defense of his/her respective area. This Plan foresees three broad situations:

- a. Pre-incident actions (crisis management).
- b. Incident/post-incident actions during condition NORMAL (consequence management).
- c. Incident/post-incident actions during periods of heightened alert (consequence management).

Although similarity exists among them, each situation will likely involve subtle differences in command relationships,

command and control arrangements, the manner to which an incident is responded, the identification of "first responders," and the extent to which other federal, state, and local agencies will become involved.

1. Situation A, Pre-incident Actions. Sufficient indications and warning exist, allowing the Base to implement appropriate THREATCON measures prior to an incident. In this situation, the Base may set THREATCON's A through D sequentially, or shift from condition NORMAL to THREATCON C or D immediately. The objective throughout this state is to demonstrate a robust antiterrorism posture sufficient to deter terrorist attack through aggressive implementation of THREATCON measures. The focus of effort will be to prevent unauthorized access to the Base/designated areas. The protection of personnel and Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA's) will be the focal point of THREATCON security measures. Internal defense of the Base will be established around a series of defensive, concentric circles or security belts. MCB, Camp Lejeune, assets will form the outer perimeter belt by controlling access to the installation and patrolling designated areas. Area Commanders will establish the second concentric security belt by providing internal security and defense of their respective areas, utilizing the Area Guard Force and other assigned assets as required. Specifically designated facilities/MEVA's, within various Base areas, will be further secured by establishing a final "point defense" security belt. General support, MCB, Camp Lejeune assets, e.g., MP, may also conduct security operations within and between the various Base areas under the control of an Area Commander.

2. Situation B, Incident/Post-incident Actions During Condition Normal (Consequence Management). An incident occurs unexpectedly during a period when there is no indications and warning; the Base has not previously implemented THREATCON measures. This situation would likely be the most catastrophic since the initial response will generally be less coordinated and, initially, lack some of the assets, which would normally be alerted and available during periods of heightened security. Limiting the extent of loss of life and other damage will largely be dependent on the actions of the first responders, the ability to contain the incident, and the speed with which other incident-response forces can be brought to bear. The objectives in this scenario are to gain control of the situation rapidly in the vicinity of the crisis site, treat, and evacuate injured/threatened personnel, contain the incident, and secure the Base. The focus of effort in this situation will be to limit the

extent of damage. MCB, Camp Lejeune, MP and Fire Protection Division assets will be among the first units to respond to an incident and will assume full control over the crisis site and areas immediately surrounding it. The CCMT will direct immediate recall of designated personnel/units via the appropriate Command Duty Officers, establishment of THREATCON D Base-wide, and activation of the CMT, TMF, and BOC.

3. Situation C, Incident/Post-incident Actions During Periods of Heightened Alert (Consequence Management). An incident occurs during a period when the Base is already under a heightened state of alert and THREATCON measures are in effect. This situation combines elements of the first two. The objectives are to gain immediate control of the situation in the vicinity of the crisis site, treat and evacuate injured/threatened personnel, contain the incident, and prevent further incidents from occurring. The focus of effort in this situation will be the coordinated employment of the AGF's and MCB, Camp Lejeune's TMF. The Commander of the CMT, via the BOC, will direct the use of the TMF as required.

4. Implementation of phased installation security measures will occur as outlined in Appendix B (Threat Levels and THREATCON's) of this Plan. Appendix B provides the concept under which this installation exercises varying degrees of security during periods of increased threat.

5. Commanding Officers (CO's), Area Commanders, and Officers in Charge (OIC's) will implement AT/FP measures to prevent terrorist actions against military personnel and property in accordance with Appendix B.

6. Area Guard Forces (AGF). In the absence of MP response, Area Commanders (where applicable) have primary responsibility for initial reaction to an AT/FP incident. They will counter such threats by rapidly alerting and deploying their AGF to secure the area. The AGF will immediately contain and isolate the incident by establishing an inner and outer perimeter in close cooperation with responding MP. It is imperative that MP be notified immediately of a terrorist event. Upon arrival of the On-Scene Commander, the Area Commander will relinquish control of the scene. To reach an orderly turnover of responsibility, MP will relieve AGF personnel performing inner perimeter security duties first, as directed by the ISS On-scene Commander. The AGF may be deployed to another area as directed by the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune (or designated representative).

Area Commanders will be prepared to support the TMF with area guards, as required, throughout the duration of an AT/FP emergency.

7. Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Security and Safety. The AC/S, ISS will be designated as Commander, Threat Management Force (CTMF). The CTMF will assume Tactical Control (TACON) of any and all AGF committed to the threatened area.

8. Military Police Special Reaction Team (SRT). In event of AT/FP contingencies, the SRT will be deployed to counter prospective threats. The SRT is composed of trained military police from PMO, under the operational control of the AC/S, ISS.

9. Augmentation. If it becomes necessary to augment the TMF, reaction forces from II MEF will be utilized. OPCON of these reaction forces will pass from the respective commander to the CTMF, in coordination with the Area Commander as applicable. It is the intent of the AC/S, ISS to employ operational units as an organic force keeping unit integrity and to use the unit's existing command and control structure to the greatest extent possible.

3003. TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY ELEMENTS

1. MCB, Camp Lejeune CO's and OIC's

a. Antiterrorism training and education is an integral component of the AT/FP readiness posture of this installation.

b. Ensure a cadre of personnel receive specialized AT/FP Instructor Qualification training through a service school and provide the names to the AC/S, ISS.

c. Ensure Level I AT/FP training is provided to individual command personnel by school-qualified instructors.

d. Ensure that periodic terrorism awareness briefings are conducted IAW reference (f).

e. Coordinate all training, lesson plans, and training aids in support of Base-level AT/FP operations with the AC/S, ISS.

f. Establish appropriate OPSEC programs within respective organizations.

2. Tenant Commands and Organizations Request that the:

a. CG, II MEF

(1) Provide an AT/FP mission-capable, battalion-sized unit and three armed security boats from Small Craft Company as a reserve force for use by the CTMF.

(2) Provide a minimum of two "FOX" NBC Detection Vehicles and trained personnel for use by the CTMF.

(3) Provide MP support from MPCo as required.

(4) Provide air assets as needed to include assets for moving personnel and equipment, air and ground surveillance, assault, medical evacuation, and to meet potential hostage taker demands.

(5) Be prepared to air transport response elements to locations designated by the CTMF, or designated representative.

(6) Provide air transportation for CMT and TMF advisory personnel from outlying areas to the scene.

(7) Provide air assets for training.

b. CO, Naval Hospital, Camp Lejeune

(1) Upon activation of the CMT, provide medical services appropriate to the special threat situation.

(2) Be responsible for the internal security of all NavHosp facilities and provide only passive response to THREATCON's. MCB, Camp Lejeune, will assume responsibility for the external security of all NavHosp activities and facilities.

(3) NavHosp's Security Department will task and organize internal physical security per reference (a). Non-medical personnel will be used to prevent/counter hostile actions against command personnel, patients, and property.

(4) Conduct antiterrorism training annually for staff as part of the Staff Education and Training Program. Names of personnel who have received antiterrorism training through service schools will be forwarded regularly to the AC/S, ISS.

(5) Provide psychological assistance to MCB, Camp Lejeune, negotiators during special threat situations and for training.

(6) Provide medical personnel and services at the scene (physician or corpsman) with an ambulance.

(7) Be prepared to allow NCIS or CID/MPI review the medical records of suspects and/or victims.

(8) Alert Emergency Room to possible gunshot and/or other trauma victims.

(9) Upon notification of a mass casualty, be prepared to deploy medical assets to evaluate, triage, treat and evacuate casualties as necessary.

(10) Communicate with local, state, and other civilian or military medical facilities as appropriate.

(11) Assist MCB, Command Chaplain with Critical Incident Stress mission.

(12) CO or his designee will participate as a member of the CMT when the team is activated.

(13) Develop and implement passive defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of NavHosp personnel, patients, family members, facilities, and equipment to terrorist acts IAW this Plan and reference (a).

(14) Develop and implement terrorism awareness training in the command training program.

(15) Coordinate public affairs matters with the CMT, CPAO representative, the Commander, Naval Medical Command, and higher authority in the event a THREATCON is announced.

(16) Organize, equip, train, and direct medical centers.

(17) Assist in the location of survivors and deceased, and assist in the rescue of survivors.

(18) Establish a field emergency medical aid station as required at the terrorist incident/disaster site, and coordinate ambulance support with the Hospital.

(19) Catalog survivors and direct segregation for further treatment.

(20) Perform mortuary duties as required.

(21) List plans and policies for treating, hospitalizing and evacuating military and civilian personnel.

3. Area Commanders

a. Create a level of awareness, appreciation, and readiness commensurate with the threat.

b. Identify vulnerable areas and write an AT/FP plan to be used during times of increased THREATCON. A list of these areas and the AT/FP Plan will be forwarded to PMO's Crime Prevention Unit and updated annually.

c. Be prepared to increase THREATCON levels in accordance with enclosure (3), Threat Levels and THREATCON's. Area Commanders will not lower THREATCON levels.

d. Ensure that units prepare bomb threat SOP's, per reference (j).

e. On order, implement related area guard plans, orders, and SOP's. Area and tenant commands that contribute assets to the AT/FP Plan should submit copies of supporting AT/FP Plans to PMO/CPU.

f. Report any special threat situation immediately to CTMF via the 911 Consolidated Dispatch Center.

g. Deploy the AGF, in cooperation with the MP, to contain the threat as needed. Upon assuming command of the incident scene, prepare to hand over control to the ISS On-Scene Commander.

h. Be prepared to provide suitable work area(s) with multiple telephone lines to personnel in support of the CTMF. Several offices or buildings may be required to support a hostage negotiation team and the On-Scene Command Post.

4. AC/S, Training, Education and Operations

a. Installation AT/FP Activities. Exercises should follow

a series of other activities designed to ensure that AT/FP training guidance has been effectively disseminated. These should include, but are not limited to:

- (1) No-notice inspections of training records.
 - (2) Field training exercises with a dedicated opposition intelligence gathering force.
 - (3) Unilateral low visibility exercises for intelligence/counterintelligence divisions (NCIS, SEAL's) directed against installation organizations, units and/or activities.
 - (4) Assurance that a strong positive threat awareness briefing is prepared for every field exercise conducted.
- b. Ensures commanders attend Level III and Level IV AT/FP training per references (a) and (b).
 - c. Ensures that the CG, C/S and subordinate commands of the installation have an understanding of AT/FP preventive measures and considerations.
 - d. Coordinates with the AC/S, ISS and NCIS for the dissemination of threat intelligence information.
 - e. Closely coordinates with the AC/S, ISS on antiterrorism planning and activities.
 - f. Identifies and tasks other support personnel as required.
 - g. Tasks the OIC, EOD with support tasks as follows:
 - (1) Train with and support MP/AGF's as required.
 - (2) Train postal personnel in letter bomb recognition and procedures.
 - (3) Train security personnel in bomb search procedures.
 - (4) Assist in training of personnel in Improvised Explosive Device (IED) recognition.
 - (5) Monitor procedures for WMD incidents.

(6) Develop an SOP for rendering safe and disposing of explosive materials.

h. Tasks OIC, Training Equipment and Visual Information Branch (TEVIB) with providing photographic and video recording capability to CTMF.

5. AC/S, Installation Security and Safety. The AC/S, ISS acts as a single point of contact to oversee the antiterrorism and force protection program for MCB, Camp Lejeune, per references (b) and (c). The AC/S, ISS is responsible for the public safety and internal security of MCB, Camp Lejeune. Under AT/FP conditions, the AC/S, ISS works in close cooperation with the AC/S, TE&O to integrate its assets and capabilities with those of other assistant chiefs of staff, Area Commanders, and tenant organizations. Additional AT/FP duties include the following:

a. Serves as the Commander, Threat Management Force during an AT/FP emergency and directly controls all assets assigned or OPCON at the scene of an AT/FP emergency (as well as other potential locations), including AGF assets, as required.

b. Ensures the development and dissemination of installation OPSEC programs and policies. Information will be disseminated through regular installation staff meetings, or at meetings of the installation and staff or CMT established specifically for this purpose.

c. As required, coordinates with NCIS and AC/S, TE&O to evaluate the adequacy of OPSEC plans and procedures.

d. Coordinates with NCIS for the conduct of periodic OPSEC briefs for military and civilian personnel.

e. Establishes reporting procedures for OPSEC violations, in coordination with NCIS.

f. The AC/S, ISS, in cooperation with the AC/S, TE&O, is responsible for overseeing the implementation of MCB, Camp Lejeune's AT/FP education and training program per references (b) and (c).

g. Serves as the Base AT/FP Officer. (Attends required Level IV AT/FP training per reference (b)).

(1) The installation's AT/FP training plan components will include:

(a) Individual AT/FP training (Level I, provided by a qualified instructor) per references (a) and (b). The individual will be made aware that he/she is the installation's first line of defense against acts of terrorism and terrorist attempts to gather intelligence. The individual will also be issued the JS Guide 5260 "Service Member's Personal Protective Guide: A Self-help Handbook to Combating Terrorism" and "Antiterrorism Individual Protective Measures" folding card. Instruction will include, but is not limited to:

1. Terrorist Operations.
2. Individual Protective Measures.
3. Surveillance Detection.
4. Hostage Survival.
5. Threat Levels and THREATCON's.
6. Actual specific threat briefs, including Cultural Awareness (for individuals deploying to foreign environments).
7. Reporting Procedures for Incidents.

(b) Unit AT/FP Officer Training (Level II Instructor Qualification Course). This will include Level I training for individual personnel (see para (1) above), as well as instructor qualification training per references (a) and (b). Instruction should include, but is not limited to:

1. Threat Updates.
2. Current Affairs.
3. Host Nation Current Affairs (for units deploying to foreign areas).
4. Interrogation Techniques.
5. Debriefing Techniques.

h. Coordinates Base AT/FP procedures with other federal, state, and local emergency management agencies as appropriate. Ensures that there is mutual understanding between all agencies that might be involved in a terrorist incident aboard the Base with regard to authority, jurisdiction and interaction as recommended by reference (c).

h. Oversees the completion of the criticality/vulnerability assessment and the preparation of a prioritized Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA) list (see Appendix A); manages the risk management effort in cooperation with the AC/S, TE&O and NCIS.

i. In cooperation with the AC/S, Comptroller, demonstrates how funding shortfalls have adversely impacted the MCB, Camp Lejeune AT/FP program as recommended by reference (c).

j. Ensures that antiterrorism plans, at a minimum, include procedures to collect and analyze terrorist threat data, procedures to enhance security posture, and procedures to respond to a terrorist event per reference (b).

k. Develops an installation Combating Terrorism Program and AT/FP Awareness Program in cooperation with the AC/S, TE&O, per reference (a).

l. Ensures that the installation's AT/FP library contains the current versions of all appropriate directives, instructions, regulations, SOP's, and other pertinent documents per reference (c).

m. Ensures that the installation conducts an AT/FP exercise annually, as outlined in Appendix D, Installation AT/FP Exercise, per reference (f).

n. Ensures that the CMT meets quarterly and conducts its business per reference (c).

o. Coordinates the acquisition of antiterrorism equipment and establishes procedures to identify requirements for related research and analysis.

p. Ensures that first responders perform consequence management action by containing and controlling the incident site, rescuing survivors, performing hasty decontamination, triaging and evacuation, and identifying, if possible, the

agent. Ensures the incident site is preserved and searched for evidentiary material. Ensures that first responders receive psychological counseling, if necessary.

q. Ensures that changes in the perceived threat (Threat Assessment) are reflected in updated Criticality and Vulnerability Assessments to this Plan.

r. Monitors OPSEC status and enforces OPSEC requirements as necessary.

s. Evaluates the OPSEC programs and procedures, as required.

t. Ensures that changes in OPSEC status are reflected, when appropriate, in the Criticality and Vulnerability Assessment of this Plan.

u. Provost Marshal. Controls the law enforcement, personnel security, and physical security of the Base, under the staff cognizance of the AC/S, ISS. AT/FP duties include the following:

(1) Is prepared to assume the duties as the CTMF and OPCON of AGF and other on-scene assets.

(2) Monitors the AT/FP posture of MCB, Camp Lejeune.

(3) Provides internal security in all matters relating to AT/FP.

(4) Prepares and updates the Physical Security Plan.

(5) Maintains close liaison with civilian law enforcement authorities and is the single point of contact between MCB, Camp Lejeune, (including tenant activities) and these agencies (excluding intelligence gathering and investigating terrorist activity, which are the responsibility of NCIS and the FBI).

(6) Trains and equips a Special Reaction Team (SRT).

(7) Is prepared to react immediately to a special threat situation anywhere on MCB, Camp Lejeune.

(8) Coordinates with NCIS, the Counterintelligence Team (CIT), civilian law enforcement, and AC/S, TE&O recommendations to the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, to establish or change THREATCON's.

(9) Coordinates with the AC/S, Facilities the planning and construction of additional installation barriers, lighting and other needed physical security measures.

(10) Conducts prior coordination and training with appropriate federal, state and local law enforcement authorities with regard to AT/FP activities.

(11) Provides executive security and protection for high-risk personnel (HRP), as required.

(12) Provides On-Scene Commander at scene of AT/FP emergency.

(13) Provides for continuous control of an AT/FP emergency scene to include security of the inner perimeter and outer perimeter, observation of areas of concern, evacuation of endangered areas, and the establishment of traffic control procedures, as required.

(14) Is prepared to conduct surveillance and countersurveillance operations in cooperation with NCIS, as required.

(15) Coordinates with NCIS and other appropriate agencies to assist in the continual updating of the threat assessment, as may be required.

(16) Provides MP-qualified Officer and Staff Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO) support to staff the BOC on an around-the-clock (24/7) basis, as required.

(17) Establishes in writing and executes specific access procedures for MCB, Camp Lejeune, during periods of increased THREATCON's.

(18) Provides input on all operational reports pertaining to AT/FP incidents, which is routed through the AC/S, ISS prior to being reviewed by the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune.

(19) Provides trained negotiators and headquarters element personnel to CTMF.

(20) Provides negotiation team equipment.

(21) Provides interrogation and negotiation support to NCIS, as required.

(22) Provides VIP protection.

(a) Purpose. VIP protection promulgates specific duties for executive or distinguished visitor protection personnel in their provision of prudent security measures to protect executive or high-risk individuals against terrorist acts.

(b) Background. Additional protection increases the amount of time terrorists need to gain physical access to executives from the onset of hostile actions and increases the interval from the time between detection of a threat and the onset of hostile action.

(c) Responsibility. PMO, in cooperation with NCIS, is responsible for the protection of high-risk personnel and executive or distinguished visitors (VIP's).

(d) Application. The following measures will be taken to protect VIP's:

1. The Provost Marshal will designate all VIP's requiring protective services.

2. PMO/CID MP Investigators, Military Police Operations (MPO's) and PMO/SRT are tasked by AC/S, ISS with providing protection to all designated VIP's.

3. The CID Officer (CIDO)/MP Investigations Officer (MPIO), or his designated representative, is responsible for planning/assigning all protective service details and assets. CID/MPI will conduct the majority of the protective services requiring the use of plain-clothed personnel. The CIDO/MPIO will coordinate with the C/S, MCB, Camp Lejeune, regarding VIP itineraries, Base Protocol, and advance parties/security details for identified VIP's to ensure that maximum support is provided.

4. PMO's MPO Section is responsible for providing mobile patrol units, escorts, traffic control, and SRT support. SRT will provide protective service details for all

site/billeting locations requiring protection and is responsible for immediate response support in the event of a crisis. SRT will also provide observation and roving posts as directed by the CIDO/MPIO.

5. The command post for VIP operations will be the CID/MPI Office unless otherwise directed by the Provost Marshal or CIDO/MPIO.

6. The K-9 Section will search VIP quarters for bombs no later than 30 minutes prior to the arrival of VIP's and no sooner than four hours before their arrival. Additionally, K-9 will search any place designated by the Provost Marshal to ensure the safety of all.

7. The Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) will ensure that all emergency and security systems have been tested at buildings that will be utilized by the VIP prior to their arrival.

v. Although the FBI may assume jurisdiction during an actual AT/FP emergency, the AC/S, ISS will ensure that MCB, Camp Lejeune, retains command and OPCON over its personnel at all times.

w. Fire Protection Division. The Fire Protection Division, under the staff cognizance of the AC/S, ISS, provides initial response to fires, accidents, and other hazardous situations/emergencies. The Fire Protection Division will take the AC/S, ISS lead in the consequence management (CM) effort resulting from the aftermath of terrorist violence and natural or manmade disasters. Other responsibilities include:

(1) Provides adequate fire protection to safeguard lives and property against fires.

(2) Prevents, limits and/or contains wild land fires within the limits of the Base.

(3) Provides mutual/automatic aid with neighboring cities/agencies, which have written agreements with MCB, Camp Lejeune.

(4) Provides technical advice to the Command on all matters pertaining to fire protection and prevention.

(5) Responds to vehicular accidents and fires, as required.

(6) Provides rescue and medical assistance within capabilities.

(7) Provides HAZMAT response within the limits of capability. Coordinates with outside agencies for additional response capability, as required.

(8) Provides specialized teams for swift water rescue, dive and recovery, confined space rescue, Helitack (helicopter-delivered fire suppression capability), and boat operations.

(9) Conducts fire prevention operations to include provision of technical assistance, fire inspection services, construction plan reviews, public education, fire investigations and juvenile intervention programs.

(10) Provides and maintains first responder chemical/biological protection capability for emergency responders.

6. Headquarters and Support Battalion. Headquarters and Support Battalion Chaplain

a. Serves as coordinator for the Base Critical Incident Stress Management Team (CISMT) response in the Consequence Management effort. Operates under the staff cognizance of the AC/S, ISS.

b. Reports to the On-Scene Commander to evaluate needs for on-site debriefing of first responders and victims, as required. Debriefings will take place in an area designated by the On-Scene Commander and will be organized so as not to interfere with ongoing security efforts. The Goettge Memorial Field House, Building 751, is designated as the default waiting area for families of hostages or families with casualties when no debriefing site has been established by the Critical Incident Stress Management Team.

c. Ensures that any and all debriefings of potential witnesses and victims are conducted only after obtaining authorization from CID/MPI/NCIS personnel.

d. Maintains active liaison with the Base Command Chaplain,

as appropriate, on issues relating to pastoral care of first responders, witnesses, and victims of terrorist violence and natural or manmade disasters.

7. Base Adjutant. The Base Adjutant operates under the staff cognizance of the AC/S, ISS and is responsible for the following actions in support of the Base AT/FP effort:

a. Provides guidance and planning assistance for managing and controlling classified material.

b. Conducts periodic security education and training. Training sessions should also be made available on request as scheduling permits.

c. Conducts Physical Security Evaluations (PSE's) of all Base units and PSE updates on command Classified Material Control Center for II MEF units.

d. Coordinates with AC/S, ISS, other Base staff departments, NCIS, and outside agencies, as appropriate, with regard to breaches of security and OPSEC requirements.

8. Naval Criminal Investigative Service

a. Prepares Threat Assessment. Advises the CG, MCB Camp Lejeune, AC/S, ISS, and AC/S, TE&O of any threat to Base.

b. Participates in MCB, Camp Lejeune, AT/FP training in cooperation with the AC/S, ISS and the AC/S, TE&O.

c. Provides trained negotiators to augment PMO, as required.

d. Provides supplemental negotiation team equipment to include offensive listening devices.

e. Provides interrogation teams in conjunction with PMO/CID/MPI personnel.

f. Provides investigators to gather intelligence on suspect(s) and victim(s) for CTMF.

g. Provides an investigative report on the incident.

h. Conducts investigation or refers to appropriate investigative agency.

i. Provides liaison personnel to the CMT and TMF.

j. Continually evaluates the intelligence threat to the installation. Changes in the terrorist/criminal-related intelligence threat will be reflected by updating the Threat Assessment and distributing, as appropriate.

k. Assists in the conduct of OPSEC briefings, in cooperation with the AC/S, ISS and the AC/S, TE&O.

9. Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities

a. THREATCON NORMAL

(1) Incorporates force protection considerations into facility planning cost estimates and site criteria for new construction.

(2) Incorporates physical security and force protection design criteria in all new construction design and major renovation projects.

b. THREATCON ALPHA

(1) Establishes a recall plan for key personnel to permit access to As Built Drawings and a utilities support team to permit shutting off electricity, water, and steam in support of AT/FP operations.

(2) Ensures all Facilities personnel possess valid Base identification cards to permit access to assigned worksites.

c. THREATCON BRAVO

(1) Identifies critical projects and contracts that will be continued into THREATCON CHARLIE and make arrangements for contractor personnel, vehicle, and equipment identification. Coordinates the procedure for mothballing non-critical construction projects and contracts.

(2) Places key BOC Facilities, Housing, Billeting, Public Works, and Maintenance personnel on 60-minute recall.

Provides documentation identifying personnel as key and essential to permit access to Base.

(3) Develops barrier material on-hand list for use during THREATCON CHARLIE.

d. THREATCON CHARLIE

(1) Places non-critical contracts and projects in mothballs.

(2) Establishes Facilities representative in BOC and retains key personnel in Housing and Billeting at their posts.

(3) Establishes robust emergency maintenance capability to respond to AT/FP incidents.

(4) Provides list of government vehicles in use each day to BOC-FAC.

(5) Provides barrier materials to AT/FP force as directed by BOC.

e. THREATCON DELTA. Provides support to incident areas as requested by the TMF Commander.

f. Provides access to blueprints of buildings as needed.

g. Provides other engineer support as needed.

h. Is prepared to provide PMO with the name, grade, organization and address of suspect(s) or victim(s) who have been assigned government quarters or billeting.

i. Provides occupant history file information on Base Housing occupants as requested by PMO.

j. Is prepared to provide portable generators and floodlights, as required.

k. Identifies new construction requirements.

l. Identifies existing structures, using Installation Vulnerability Assessment (IVA) tools that do not meet baseline standards

m. Ensures that procedures have been established to guarantee that all military construction projects are reviewed at the conceptual stage to incorporate physical security, AT/FP, or protective design features per references (c) and (d).

n. Aids in developing construction policies for incorporating AT/FP design measures into military construction projects and modification to existing facilities.

10. Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics

a. Provides transportation to move military and civilian personnel on or off Base, as required.

b. Provides food services as required by CTMF.

c. Ensures there are adequate supplies of pyrotechnics, such as hand-held flares, smoke grenades and CS gas in stock at the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP).

d. Provides inventory and accountability procedure input into the physical security program for the administrative control of property.

e. Ensures that a proper maintenance plan has been established.

f. Ensures that a proper transportation plan has been established.

g. Ensures proper command and control over all property assigned.

h. Develops contingency plans for moving equipment.

i. Develops SOP for all equipment that has been moved and is currently in the Base Motor Pool to ensure that proper security measures have been followed to prevent incidents.

j. Ensures proper procedures are followed in handling and safeguarding munitions to include: Ammunition Supply Points (ASP's), distribution of munitions, and conduct of inspections as appropriate.

k. Implements an effective cargo security system based upon standing policy and risk analysis.

1. Assesses the threat to cargo based upon its sensitivity, vulnerability and mode of transportation.

m. Maintains sufficient quantities of MOPP Level 4 equipment to support 10 percent of the Base military population.

11. Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller

a. Ensures AT/FP funding requirements are included in the installation's budgeting process for ultimate inclusion in the Program Objectivity Memorandum (POM) cycle, per reference (c).

b. Ensures required AT/FP enhancements have been identified, prioritized, and funded.

c. Identifies AT/FP funded project shortfalls, in concert with the AC/S, ISS, for each fiscal year and advises the installation commander, per reference (b).

12. Staff Judge Advocate

a. Provides legal advice on all matters relating to AT/FP.

b. Provides a legal advisor to the CMT and TMF for pre-incident training.

c. Provides other SJA assets as requested.

d. Ensures that the commander and key staff, especially the installation's AT/FP Officer, understand the legal considerations of developing and implementing an AT/FP program. A thorough introductory overview can be found in reference (g).

e. Assists in the interface among military, federal, state, and local authorities dealing with AT/FP issues.

f. Assists in interpreting appropriate documentation concerning any AT/FP issue.

13. Director, Consolidated Public Affairs Office. Because terrorists seek media recognition, media information management is a key component of the MCB, Camp Lejeune, AT/FP effort.

a. To facilitate, within the restrictions of OPSEC, briefing officers will ensure timely unrestricted disclosure of unclassified information to civilian news media. Guidance from

higher headquarters and the privacy of individuals concerned are subject to the following additional restrictions:

(1) Discuss only those matters over which the spokesperson has direct responsibility or personal knowledge.

(2) Do not discuss political matters.

(3) Do not discuss specific operational capabilities or future plans, which could be of use to the perpetrator.

(4) Do not answer speculative questions or render opinion on real or hypothetical ("what if") situations.

(5) Limit interviews of individual Marines to command or TMF. These interviews will be in the presence of an escort officer and coordinated through the Director, CPAO.

(6) If current guidance is insufficient to answer the query, forward the inquiry (and proposed response) to the Director, CPAO, for clearance by phone or in writing.

(7) With proper security at the source, coverage by civilian journalists will normally be assumed totally releasable. In the case of inadvertent or deliberate security violations by civilian journalists, the Director, CPAO, will be notified immediately for further guidance.

(8) A verbatim copy of all releases and query responses will be maintained.

b. Maintain liaison/coordination with the news media.

c. Establish a Combined Information Bureau (CIB) or press center to coordinate and control public affairs and civilian news and media activity during a terrorist threat/incident. The CIB will be located at CPAO, Building 67. It will commence operations upon setting of THREATCON CHARLIE and be secured on order from the Director, CPAO. The Deputy Director, CPAO, will be the senior representative at the CIB.

d. Serve as the single MCB, Camp Lejeune, point of contact for news releases.

- e. Provide public information services as needed, including Carolina Marines (MCB, Camp Lejeune/MCAS, New River cable television) releases.
- f. Ensure a sufficient number of knowledgeable escorts are present to coordinate movement and control of civilian news media, if required.
- g. Provide escorts of civilian news media personnel from the Main Gate to the CIB.
- h. Establish and organize accreditation procedures for civilian news representatives.
- i. Obtain approval from the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, and the AC/S, ISS (or designated representative) for the following items:
- (1) News releases (SJA approval may also be needed).
 - (2) Media to enter outer perimeter. (CPAO is responsible for media's safety and must coordinate at the incident site with the On-Scene Commander.)
 - (3) Release of any motion and still photographs, videotapes, or sound tapes of the terrorist incident.
 - (4) Interview with anyone other than the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, the AC/S, ISS, and Provost Marshal.
- j. Establishes guidelines, in concert with DoD guidance, for CPAO personnel to operate under special threat circumstances and provide liaison to the TMF at any active incident scene.
- k. Revises public affairs plans to meet the installation's information distribution requirements for AT/FP issues or occurrences.
- l. When civilian news media are present, a minimum of one daily unclassified briefing will be held on a noninterference basis. The Director, CPAO, will conduct such briefings. All briefings and related queries will be tape-recorded.

m. Security

- (1) Security at the source is mandatory.

(2) Access to operation, intelligence and other sensitive areas must be closely controlled. Military escorts for civilian news media are mandatory.

(3) No civilian correspondent is cleared for classified information.

(4) Off-the-record statements will not be made to civilian correspondents. All statements will be considered for the record and considered to have been released to the public when made.

(5) CPAO-prepared releases will be screened by OPSEC personnel for possible security violations prior to issue.

(6) Information concerning training of security forces, their equipment, and security posture of the installation will not be provided to the civilian news media.

n. Audiovisual

(1) Maximum effort will be made to obtain still, audio, and video coverage of all actions in support of the OPLAN for immediate release.

(2) The CPAO Press Chief will give daily assignments to the CPAO combat correspondents. Support beyond CPAO capabilities will be coordinated with the OIC, TEVIB.

(3) The OIC, TEVIB, photo-processing laboratory will provide processing support for public affairs photography.

(4) The Director, CPAO, or appointed representative, will clear all still and audiovisual materials for public release upon completion of security review.

(5) The CPAO Media Section will ensure that all local television news shows are videotaped throughout the incident for review by the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune.

(6) Historical documentation and operational coverage is the responsibility of the OIC, TEVIB under the control of the AC/S, TE&O.

14. Assistant Chief of Staff, Management Support Department

- a. Develops a comprehensive AT/FP Incident Information Management Plan.
- b. Assigns qualified personnel to manage and operate communications in the BOC.
- c. Develops contingency plans for situations when the normal forms of communication are interrupted.
- d. Establishes and maintains communications during noncritical and critical situations.
- e. Is prepared to augment TMF with additional communication equipment.
- f. Is prepared to provide computer data links on request from CTMF.
- g. Is prepared to provide secured communications for AT/FP operations.
- h. Develops programs and monitors proper COMSEC procedures.
- i. Pays particular attention to monitoring WEB sites that might reveal significant vulnerabilities of the installation.
- j. Coordinates with the AC/S, ISS and AC/S, TE&O for periodic updates on possible changes in OPSEC status.

15. MCB Command Chaplain

- a. Acts as advisor and consultant to the commander on all matters of religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion.
- b. Helps coordinate all potential AT/FP issues that arise in connection with religious customs or practices.
- c. Coordinates/maintains liaison with local churches, religious bodies throughout the communal area of responsibility.
- d. Provides unit, area, and denominational ministry for all personnel.
- e. Coordinates with the Base HqSptBn Chaplain as needed, especially in matters relating to the CISMT.

16. Assistant Chief of Staff, Manpower

a. Ensures normal personnel policies and procedures are continued as deemed appropriate. Certain situations may dictate change or modification of policy.

b. Ensures leave is granted for nonessential personnel during increased threat conditions.

c. Establishes personnel recall priorities for the implementation of a general recall. Ensures guard duties take priority over section duties in situations where a Marine or Sailor is recalled as a member of the AGF.

d. Should a prolonged incident occur, reviews requests for replacement of critical personnel. Replacements will be requested on an as-needed basis.

e. Although the FBI may assume jurisdiction during an actual AT/FP emergency, ensures that MCB, Camp Lejeune, retains command and OPCON over its personnel at all times.

17. Assistant Chief of Staff, Environmental Management Department obtains/provides a Base grid map for standardization of the Base-wide planning and operational effort.

3004. JURISDICTION. MCB, Camp Lejeune, is a federal reservation with exclusive jurisdiction and as such is under the control of the Commanding General. Certain criminal acts come under the jurisdiction of AC/S, ISS/PMO or NCIS; but when terrorists commit these acts, they come under the jurisdiction of the FBI, who has primary responsibility for terrorist incidents.

1. Incident Classification. The most critical aspect in defining authority during an incident involves identifying the incident as a terrorist action. Certain criminal acts come under PMO's or NCIS's jurisdiction; but when these acts are committed by terrorists or suspected terrorists, they come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice. The FBI is the DOJ's operational agency for managing terrorist incidents within the United States. Indicators that help classify a situation as "terrorist" include the following:

a. Perpetrators identify themselves as terrorists.

- b. Perpetrators are recognized by law enforcement or intelligence forces as known terrorists.
- c. Political ideology is expressed through slogans or papers.
- d. Individuals use military-type uniforms and/or armament.
- e. Groups use bombs or other explosive devices.
- f. Groups issue special demands or express grievances relating to a terrorist group or philosophy.

2. Notification. Once an incident has been identified as a terrorist action, the FBI must be notified promptly.

3. Phases of Incident. A terrorist incident may be divided into the following phases, which may or may not occur concurrently:

a. Phase I. Phase I involves immediate response to a terrorist situation. When an incident occurs, the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, uses MP and the SRT to provide the initial response. The CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, may take such immediate action as may be necessary to protect life and property during the initial phase before the FBI response team arrives at the scene.

b. Phase II. Phase II manages resources required to counter a prolonged terrorist situation. The FBI has primary jurisdiction in terrorist incidents and either assumes or declines jurisdiction based on federal interest. The military supports the FBI under current DoD and DOJ MOU's. Military personnel remain under direct control of the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune. If the FBI does not assume jurisdiction and the incident is beyond the Base's ability, the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, may, through appropriate channels, request additional military forces.

c. Phase III. Phase III continues to manage resources required to counter a prolonged terrorist situation. The National Command Authority (NCA) intercedes if the FBI or installation cannot resolve the incident. The NCA provides specially trained civilian and military forces to resolve the incident. If the FBI assumes initial jurisdiction, requests for assistance from the NCA are submitted through DOJ under current DoD and DOJ MOU's. If the NCA commits military forces, the

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directs military operations according to law enforcement policies determined by the Attorney General.

4. Responsibilities

a. Provost Marshal's Office. The PMO and Military Police have authority and jurisdiction as the Commanding General's representatives over all personnel within the limits of Camp Lejeune in matters of law enforcement and are responsible for the security of the installation.

(1) Emergency Rule. The CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, has authority to take immediate actions necessary to save lives or mitigate property damage when local authorities are unable to control the situation. When the Base Commander orders such actions, the following considerations apply:

(a) Properly report the military response to higher headquarters.

(b) Document all the facts and surrounding circumstances to meet any subsequent challenge of impropriety.

(c) Retain military response under the military chain of command.

(d) Limit military involvement to the minimum demanded by necessity.

(e) Emergency situations include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Providing civilian or mixed civilian/military firefighting assistance where Base fire departments have mutual aid agreements with nearby civilian communities.

2. Emergency explosive ordnance disposal service.

3. Emergency use of working dog teams to aid in locating lost persons (humanitarian acts) or explosive devices (domestic emergencies).

b. DoD. In accordance with current policy, all military preparations and operations, including the employment of

military forces at the scene of a terrorist incident, will be the primary responsibility of the SecDef. Military forces will not be committed off installation without Presidential approval unless such use falls under the Emergency Rule, as stated above.

c. FBI. The FBI will:

(1) Be notified as soon as possible of all terrorist incidents.

(2) Exercise jurisdiction if the Attorney General or his designee determines that such incident is a matter of significant federal interest.

(3) Be the final authority to decide to exercise its jurisdiction. If declined, military authority will take appropriate action to resolve the incident.

(4) Be responsible for contacts and coordination with other agencies, both federal and local.

(5) Request DoD support if necessary.

(6) Make the initial tactical response if they assume jurisdiction.

(7) Notify DoD if there is a potential for military involvement off installation.

(8) Provide personnel for use by the installation commander, e.g., snipers, observers or in other support roles. (FBI personnel may not participate in the tactical assault unless expressly authorized by the FBI Special Agent-in-Charge.)

3005. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

1. Procedural

a. Notification Procedures. A response to a terrorist attack or special threat situation may be initiated through a number of circumstances, including response by an Area Guard Force or MP. An incident uncovered by AGF or other personnel may be reported to other agencies, but the official notification procedure begins with the Consolidated Emergency Dispatch Center at extension 911. Appendix C establishes procedures for

notifying appropriate staff elements, the CMT, emergency response units, support/service personnel, and other installation occupants of an impending or actual AT/FP incident.

b. Use of Force and Searches. Reference (k) establishes procedures for arming security and law enforcement personnel and the use of force. The following information is provided as additional guidance in using force as it pertains to terrorist incidents aboard Camp Lejeune. Commanders will ensure their Marines know procedures established in reference (k) and as set forth below.

(1) Definitions

(a) Deadly Force. That force which a person uses to cause serious bodily harm or death, or which a reasonable and prudent person would consider likely to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.

(b) Serious Bodily Harm. Injuries which have the strong potential to be life threatening or result in permanent loss of use of an organ or limb, including fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of body and serious damage to internal or sensory organs.

(2) Use of Force

(a) General rule. When conducting special threat operations, Security Forces will use the minimum force necessary to:

1. Contain and isolate the threat.
2. Gain time to assemble additional forces as required.
3. Gather information to fully define the threat.
4. Neutralize the threat, if directed by competent authority.

(b) Non-deadly Force Options. The commander, TMF will exhaust all non-deadly force options before using, or requesting to use, deadly force. Non-deadly force options include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Negotiations.
2. Denial of food or medical attention.
3. Interruption of utilities.
4. Show of force, including the use of riot control formations.
5. Riot control agents, if authorized by the competent authority.

(3) Searches. Elements of the TMF/AGF may search individuals or private property without a search authorization or warrant only in the following circumstances:

(a) Stop and Frisk. If there is reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, that person may be temporarily stopped and questioned about his/her activities. The stop must be limited in duration to that which is reasonably necessary to investigate the suspicion. If there is a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a person may be armed and dangerous, a "frisk" (an external "pat down" of the clothing) for weapons may be conducted. Weapons and items, which could reasonably serve as weapons, discovered during a frisk may be seized.

(b) Search Incident to Apprehension. A person lawfully apprehended may be searched for weapons or destructible evidence. A search for weapons or destructible evidence may also be conducted in the area where the person apprehended could reach with a sudden movement to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. A search for persons who might interfere with or endanger members of the TMF/AGF who are apprehending an individual may be made in the general area where such persons could reasonably hide. Weapons or items of evidence observed in plain view during the conduct of these activities may be seized.

(c) Search Based on Exigent Circumstances. Elements of the TMF may conduct searches without a warrant where there is:

1. Reason to believe (probable cause) that weapons, objects related to criminal activity, or persons believed to have committed an offense are in the place to be searched.

2. Reason to believe that the delay necessary to obtain a search authorization or warrant would result in removal of the weapons, destruction of the objects related to criminal activity, or escape.

(d) Emergency Searches. Elements of the TMF may make an immediate entry into a building when there is reason to believe that entry is necessary to prevent injury to persons or serious damage to property, or to render aid to someone who is in danger.

(e) Hot Pursuit. Elements of the TMF who are pursuing a person believed to have just committed a serious crime may enter a vehicle or building believed to have been entered by the suspect. TMF may search the vehicle or building for the suspect or any weapons that might be used to further the suspect's escape.

(f) Plain View Seizures. During the course of their lawful activities, elements of the TMF may seize any unlawful weapons or objects related to criminal activity, which they observe in plain view.

(g) Government Searches. Elements of the TMF may enter and search government property, both real and personal, for any lawful purpose. Government property issued to individuals for their personal, as opposed to official, use (e.g., government quarters, wall lockers, and duffel bags), will be treated as private property.

(h) Consent Searches. Searches may be conducted of any person or property with lawful consent. A person may consent to a search of his or her person or property. The consent can be limited in any way by the person granting consent, including limitations in terms of time, place or property and may be withdrawn at any time. To be valid, consent must be given voluntarily.

(i) Whenever feasible, all searches, including "pat downs," will be conducted by personnel who are the same sex as the person being searched.

(4) Seizure of Evidence

(a) Seize all weapons, contraband, or other evidence found. Take every precaution to preserve any evidence seized.

Handle the evidence as little as possible. Record the name and grade or title of every person who takes possession of the evidence.

(b) Immediately report the seizure of evidence through command channels to PMO, MCB, Camp Lejeune, and await further instructions. As soon as circumstances permit, record all known facts surrounding the seizure.

(5) Apprehension of Individuals. Elements of the TMF may apprehend (take into custody) any person based on a reasonable belief that the person has committed, or is committing, a crime. If the situation permits, request the MP make the apprehension. Always use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances. Immediately report the apprehension of a person through command channels to PMO, MCB, Camp Lejeune, and await further instructions. As soon as circumstances permit, record all known facts surrounding the apprehension.

(6) If the situation permits, consult SJA prior to initiating a search, seizure, or apprehension.

c. Installation AT/FP Exercises. Installation AT/FP exercises will be conducted annually, or more frequently, as directed by the Commanding General, per reference (f).

d. Incident Response. The AC/S, ISS is responsible for developing plans and procedures to deal with specific threats to the installation. Particular consideration will be given to ongoing analysis, in close cooperation with NCIS, of the following areas:

(1) The nature and capability of the threat.

(2) Historical data relating to past incidents.

(3) Installation vulnerabilities to include: Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA's), as well as potential targets of a high visibility, casualty producing, or recognition value to potential terrorist.

(4) Evaluation of potential High-Risk Personnel based upon positions, experience and current operations. Persons designated as HRP will be appropriately protected. The AC/S, ISS is also responsible for reaction to police and fire emergencies. The AC/S, ISS, in conjunction with Area Guard

Forces, will play a key role responding to incidents of AT/FP concern to the installation. Other key AC/S, ISS responsibilities are:

(1) Coordination with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies (in close cooperation with NCIS).

(2) Coordination with security and safety-related organizations outside the MCB, Camp Lejeune, chain of command, which may have special capabilities of value to the Camp Lejeune AT/FP effort. Use of such assets as HAZMAT teams, chemical detection capability, aviation support, etc., will be formalized through MOU's whenever feasible.

e. Reaction. In order to establish the proper organizational base upon which to build an extended installation level response (in response to a prolonged incident) and due to the special circumstances inherent in responding to terrorist incidents, the following concerns will also be considered from the earliest response stages:

(1) The possibility that the incident being responded to is a diversion or part of a multiple incident/attack. Good patrol area discipline is vital. A terrorist incident should never be considered "the only show in town."

(2) Consideration should be given early on to establish and maintain effective communications between the Consolidated Dispatch Center (Bldg 18), the ISS On-Scene Commander, BOC/CMT, NCIS, and Area Command representatives. If the incident has the potential to affect our outlying civilian communities, proper liaison will be established.

(3) A proper record of activities and events is important for after action, as well as possible evidentiary purposes.

(4) Media inquiries will always be referred to CPAO.

f. Consequence Management. The Crisis Management Team also serves to plan and coordinate Camp Lejeune's Consequence Management (CM) effort under training and actual crisis situations. CM efforts will be included in AT/FP exercises. Consequence Management is achieved through procedures as defined in reference (i).

g. Executive or Distinguished Visitor Protection Procedures. The AC/S, ISS will ensure that the personal security requirements of executive and distinguished visitors are properly coordinated through PMO/CID/MPI, NCIS and responsible security representatives of principal personnel. The AC/S, TE&O will ensure that those individuals identified as "at risk" receive appropriate training per reference (f).

2. Physical Security Measures

a. Access Control. Under the staff cognizance of the AC/S, ISS, PMO has the responsibility of access control to the installation. Details of the methods and procedures used at installation gates to control pedestrian, vehicular, and mail/package access per reference (d) are outlined below.

(1) Background. This access control plan is simple, understandable, and workable to ensure that the security objectives are met without impeding efficient operations.

(2) Application. A positive control system will be established at each gate to preclude unauthorized entry of pedestrian and vehicle traffic to the installation.

(a) Sentries will require all personnel requesting access to the Base to state their destination and present an identification card.

(b) All suspicious vehicles and large delivery vehicles will be searched. Delivery vehicle trip manifests will be checked.

(c) Additional personnel will be assigned to the gates to assist with vehicle searches.

(d) Unauthorized personnel will be denied access and ordered to leave the installation immediately.

(e) Individuals who are suspected terrorists or who are suspected of transferring terrorist materials will be detained, and the chain of command will immediately be notified.

(3) Coordination. When implementing increased levels of access control, all measures, within reason, should be taken to notify Area Commanders and CPAO. An article in the Base

newspaper as well as a Base-wide LAN should be sent to advise personnel of the increased threat level and possible delays.

b. Barriers

(1) Purpose. Physical barriers control, deny, impede, delay and discourage access to controlled/noncontrolled areas by unauthorized persons. Barriers define the perimeter of a controlled area, optimize the use of security forces and enhance detection and apprehension opportunities by security force personnel.

(2) Background. Physical barriers establish a physical and psychological deterrent to entry and serve notice that entry is not permitted. They also assist in channeling the flow of personnel and vehicles through designated routes in a manner that permits efficient operation of the personnel identification control system. There are two major types of physical barriers, natural and structural, that will delay an intruder's attempt to access a controlled area. In order for barriers to be effective, a security force or other means of observation/protection must augment them.

(3) Responsibility. PMO, under the staff cognizance of the AC/S, ISS, is responsible for ensuring that capabilities are practiced for the placement of barriers in accordance with this Plan. The AC/S, Facilities is responsible for providing additional barriers if deemed necessary and deploying them at the direction of the MP.

(4) Application. The Crime Prevention Unit conducts annual Physical Security Surveys of the ten pedestrian/vehicle entry points.

(a) Existing Jersey Barriers are pre-staged at all pedestrian/vehicle entry points. When set in place, these barriers will be filled with water by the Fire Protection Division.

(b) In addition to the pre-staged barriers, sandbags and/or 55-gallon drums filled with cement, sand, or water, can be used with the Jersey Barriers as a passive barrier system to slow down, channelize, or stop inbound/outbound traffic.

(c) The perimeter of the roadway can be hardened with the use of bollards, four feet high, with a cable running through them to channel traffic on the roadway.

(d) The use of low boys, bulldozers, and large trucks provided by Base Motor Transport assets can also be used as an active barrier system.

c. Lighting

(1) Purpose. Protective (or security) lighting increases the effectiveness of security forces performing their duties, has considerable value as a deterrent to thieves and vandals and increases the difficulty of potential saboteur or terrorists from accessing the installation undetected.

(2) Background. Lighting should provide adequate illumination or compensating measures to discourage or help security forces detect attempts to enter restricted areas and to reveal the presence of unauthorized person(s) within such areas. Requirements for protective lighting at an activity may vary depending upon the situation and areas to be protected.

(3) Responsibility. The AC/S, ISS is responsible for recommending that protective (security) lighting has been included in all new construction and modifications aboard the installation. The AC/S, FAC, in cooperation with the AC/S, ISS, is responsible for planning, installing, and maintaining adequate lighting for all approaches to the installation. Protective lighting should enable guard force personnel to observe activities around or inside the installation without disclosing their presence.

(4) Application. PMO/CPU conducts surveys aboard the Base and reviews blueprints for all security-related issues. They are responsible for the structure lighting of all entry control points (vehicle gates) along the perimeter of the installation.

(a) All entry control points (vehicle gates) currently have continuous, stationary, controlled lighting. The controls and switches are located within a protected area and guarded at all times.

(b) In the event of a scheduled power outage, the use of emergency mobile lighting is available as needed.

(c) In the event of an unscheduled power outage, the Fire Protection Division and AC/S, Logistics will be contacted to coordinate the use of alternate lighting, i.e., diesel generated lighting systems, until power is restored.

(d) When a power outage has occurred or is imminent, contact will be made with the emergency maintenance department to have power restored as soon as possible.

d. Technology

(1) General. Comprehensive threat analysis conducted by AT/FP planners of AC/S, ISS and NCIS will identify areas where technology can be implemented to enhance the security of the installation.

(2) Background. Technology improvements to achieve more cost-effective intrusion detection are introduced to protect personnel, activities, equipment, and materials.

(3) Responsibility. PMO, under the staff cognizance of the AC/S, ISS, is responsible for coordinating with other staff departments and agencies to monitor emerging technologies, which could enhance the overall physical security posture of the installation.

(4) Application. The following types of technology can be implemented to increase the security of an area:

(a) Closed Circuitry Television (CCTV). CCTV may be used on gates that are not manned continuously, or on entrances to vaults or spaces where materials of security interest are stored. The system normally consists of a television camera, monitor and electrical circuitry. The camera may be remotely controlled by monitoring personnel and can also be used to complement an intrusion detection system (IDS). In this configuration, the CCTV can be triggered automatically or by personnel at the alarm control center and can be used to determine whether response forces should be dispatched.

(b) Electronic Vehicle Pass System (EVPS). An electronic card reader system utilized to control visitors by keeping detailed information and photographs of individuals entering secured areas aboard the installation.

(c) Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). IDS's are an

essential element of any in-depth physical security program. An IDS consists of sensors capable of detecting one or more types of phenomena, signal media, enunciators, and energy sources for signaling the entry into the area protected by the system. IDS's are designed to detect, not prevent, actual or attempted penetrations.

3. Threat Specific Responsibilities

a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

(1) Background

(a) The threat of WMD terrorism is different than the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) use on a battlefield. As events in Tokyo (1995 Serin attack), New York City (1993 World Trade Center), and Oregon (1984 Salmonella Bacterium attack) indicate, the use of chemical and biological agents in a terrorist attack is not only possible, but has been well planned and executed. While these attacks have had varying success, it is undeniable that they have terrorized millions. This outlines the action MCB, Camp Lejeune will take to mitigate or prevent the use of WMD aimed at the Base.

(b) While the fielded U.S. military is educated, trained, and equipped to operate in an "NBC" environment, the rear areas and non-deployed forces are less so. To a terrorist looking to terrorize the U.S., an installation makes an inviting target. Many areas on the installation naturally tend to congregate large masses of unprotected people, i.e., the exchange, dependent and military schools, the theater, and troop formations. Positive, proactive measures should be in place to help lessen the effects of a WMD attack.

(2) Assumptions

(a) There is an increased possibility of a WMD attack due to the relative ease of access to chemicals, explosives, and plan designs for devices.

(b) Procedures for Bomb Threat Incidents are covered in reference (j).

(c) A WMD scenario may exceed the crisis response/consequence management capabilities of Base resources.

(d) Extensive DoD, state and federal support will be required to cope with a WMD scenario.

(e) WMD incidents are often a combination of three types: hazardous materials incident, a mass casualty incident, and a crime scene.

(f) Chemical/biological WMD incidents pose significant problems for first responders.

(g) The Base should maintain the capability to contain WMD incidents until the arrival of DoD, state and federal response forces.

(h) Effective planning, proactive passive/active protective measures and continuous exercising of crisis action plans will mitigate the effects of WMD.

(i) The Base will maintain MOU's with appropriate state and federal agencies.

(j) The Base will maintain Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) 4 for 10 percent of the Base military population. This includes the ability to detect and monitor the presence of chemical agents.

(k) Procedures and protective equipment are required for first responders, i.e., emergency medical services, firefighters, and MP. This can include MOPP 4 protective gear, OSHA level-A equivalent detection equipment, and a heightened awareness for the presence of NBC agents.

(l) Decontamination measures will consist of rinsing with gross amount of water/bleach mixture.

(m) The FBI has primary jurisdiction for investigating WMD incidents; FEMA has responsibility for Consequence Management.

(3) Action. On a continuing basis and in conjunction with state and federal agencies, MCB, Camp Lejeune, will be prepared to respond to a WMD incident by conducting pre-incident planning and mitigation measures and by performing crisis response/Consequence Management aimed at lessening the effects of a WMD incident once they occur.

(a) Concept of Operations

1. Commanding General, MCB, Camp Lejeune

a. Retains jurisdiction for WMD incidents and is prepared to establish a unified command relationship with responding federal, state, and county forces.

b. Exercises command and control through the Crisis Management Team.

c. Employs the Threat Management Force to deal with the threat.

2. AC/S, Training, Education and Operations

a. When directed by the CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, and in the absence of the C/S, MCB, Camp Lejeune, convenes the CMT.

b. Activates the BOC.

c. Coordinates AC/S, TE&O After-Action Report input.

3. Special Agent in Charge, NCIS. Ensures that all sources of intelligence are used to develop a threat assessment, which covers WMD, i.e., terrorist groups who have used or have the capability to use WMD, the types of agents used, and the means of delivery.

4. On-Scene Commander

a. Forwards operational and logistical requirements to the BOC.

b. Establishes a hasty decontamination site.

c. Identifies the chemical/biological agent if possible. Commercial HAZMAT containers have Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and can be referenced to determine containment and safety procedures.

d. Takes all prudent measures to contain and/or mitigate the effects of the attack.

e. Determines weather conditions at the incident site. Is prepared to evacuate downwind areas.

f. Establishes a safety zone, i.e., Hot, Warm, and Cold Zones.

5. CO, NavHosp, MCB, Camp Lejeune

a. Ensures first responders are provided a sufficient amount of NBC training, supplies and equipment, i.e., NBC protection suits, Biological Smart Tickets, M256A1 kits, APD 2000, AN/PRD-77, for response to NBC-contaminated incident scenes.

b. Maintains Nerve Agent Antidote Kit NAAK MK 1 kits (Atropine and 2 PAM Chloride) for 10% of the Base population.

c. Provides an on-scene medical officer to coordinate/supervise triage and evacuation actions.

d. Is prepared to execute the Mass Casualty Plan.

e. Establishes a procedure for patient tracking and accountability.

f. Manages the MCB, Camp Lejeune, Anthrax Vaccination Program (AVIP).

6. AC/S, Installation Security and Safety

a. Ensures first responders are provided a sufficient amount of NBC training, supplies and equipment, i.e., NBC protection suits, Biological Smart Tickets, M256A1 kits, APD 2000, AN/PRD-77), for response to NBC-contaminated incident scenes.

b. Ensures firefighting personnel maintain an on-scene capability to identify NBC agents.

c. Establishes procedures for dispatchers to query/identify incoming calls for potential WMD incidents.

d. Provides on-scene command and control per paragraph 5a, page 3-13, of this Plan. Establishes cordon based on weather conditions.

e. Is prepared to perform hasty decontamination of victims.

f. Recommends activation of the CMF, as required.

g. Retains primary staff support for WMD planning.

h. Ensures training exercises involve WMD scenarios.

i. Ensures WMD integrates available DoD, state, and federal response force and resources.

j. Makes recommendations for implementing increased THREATCON's.

k. Coordinates and submits After-Action Reports.

7. AC/S, Environmental Management Department

a. Ensures WMD scenarios are incorporated into Base HAZMAT response procedures.

b. Ensures that Base HAZMAT response teams are capable of responding to a WMD scenario.

c. Is prepared to dispose of NBC-contaminated waste material.

d. Is prepared to test Base drinking water and water drainage areas after a WMD incident.

8. AC/S, Logistics. Maintains sufficient quantities of MOPP Level 4 equipment to support 10% of the Base military population.

9. OIC, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

a. Is prepared to operate in an NBC environment.

b. Is prepared to defuse or render safe in an NBC environment.

(4) Coordinating Instructions

(a) Priority of Consequence Management actions for incident responders:

1. Control/containment of incident site and surrounding areas.
2. Rescue operations for survivors.
3. Decontamination of injured.
4. Triage and evacuation of injured.
5. Collection and identification of the deceased.
6. Site cleanup and HAZMAT disposal.
7. Return incident site to normal operations.

(b) The installation's primary responsibility is containment of the agent and rescue of those believed to be alive.

(c) All victims of a chemical or biological agent attack will be hastily decontaminated before evacuation to a medical facility. Patient decontamination is achieved by:

1. Removing victim from Hot Zone.
2. Removing contaminated clothing.
3. Rinsing with gross quantities of water and/or using various decontamination solutions.

(d) Identification/classification of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials is obtained by using various detection devices.

1. Biological Smart Tickets can be used to identify biological warfare agents Bacillus Anthracis (Anthrax),